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Many politicians and pundits are panicked
over the existing state of the oil and gasoline mar-
kets. Disregarding past experience, these parties
advocate massive intervention in those markets,
which would only serve to repeat and extend pre-
vious errors. These interventionists propose solu-
tions to nonexistent problems.
This Policy Analysis reviews the academic liter-
ature relevant to thesematters and argues that the
prevailing policy proposals are premised on a mis-
understanding of energy economics and market
realities. The interventionists do not distinguish
between problems that government can remedy
and those that it cannot. They ignore lessons that
should have been learned from past experience.
They embrace at best second- and third-best reme-
dies rather than first-best remedies for the alleged
problems. Moreover, they ignore the extreme dif-
ficulty associated with ensuring efficient policy
response even when it seems to be theoretically
warranted.
Fear of oil imports is premised on pernicious
myths that have long distorted energy policy.
The U.S. defense posture probably would not be
altered by reducing the extent to which oil is
imported from troublesome regions. Fears about
a near-term peak in global oil production are
unwarranted, and government cannot help mar-
kets to respond properly even if the alarm proved
correct. Market actors will produce the capital
necessary for needed investments; no “Marshall
Plans” are necessary. Price signals will efficiently
order consumer behavior; energy-consumption
mandates are therefore both unwise and unnec-
essary. Finally, more caution is needed regarding
the case for public action to address global
warming.
The omnipresent calls for more aggressive
energy diplomacy are misguided. Economic theo-
ry validated by historical experience implies that
the diplomatic initiatives are exercises in futility
because they seek to divert countries from the
wealth maximization that is their goal. Similarly,
the search for favorable access to crude oil is futile.
Despite their popularity, rules to force reductions
in energy use lack economic justification. Attacks
on American oil companies and speculators seek
to shift blame to those subject toU.S. government
control from the uncontrollable foreign oil-pro-
ducing governments that are truly to blame.
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Introduction
The vast majority of both Republican and
Democratic politicians, including those in the
George W. Bush administration,1 are pushing
for increasedgovernmental interventioninener-
gy markets. A disappointingly large number of
organizations that analyze policy issues have
likewise issued reports supporting such inter-
vention.Withthepublicationofareport in2007
titled Hard Truths: Facing the Hard Truths about
Energy: A Comprehensive View to 2030 of Global Oil
and Natural Gas,2 the National Petroleum
Council joined, among others, the National
Commission on Energy Policy,3 the Council on
Foreign Relations,4 and the Milken Institute5 in
support of additional interventions in energy
markets.6 The source for the call—the oil indus-
try itself—probably explains the attention the
NPC report initially received.7 While there was
little new in the report, its fuller-than-usual cov-
erage ofmany of the issues that currently haunt
policymakers, the attention ithas received from
the trade press, and the fact that it came from
theoil industry itselfmakes itaconvenientstart-
ing point for a discussion about energymarkets
and public policy.
AnOverview ofHard Truths and Other
Energy Proposals
The standard 2008 case for energy interven-
tion cites the dangers of oil-import dependence
and the related problem of high oil prices; the
undesirability of oil use because of depletion,
undesirable environmental impacts, or both;
and the danger of globalwarmingdue to fossil-
fuel consumption.This isoftenaggregated into
a call for energy independence, but energy inde-
pendence is inconsistentwith oil-depletion and
environmental-impact concerns. The NPC
report curiously rejects these standardpremises
but devises similarly unsatisfactory alternative
rationalizations for the samepolicymeasuresas
other commentators advocate. The executive
summary of the NPC report argues that the
United States must
• Moderate the growing demand for ener-
gy by increasing efficiency of transporta-
tion, residential, commercial, and indus-
trial uses.8
• Expand and diversify production from
clean coal, nuclear, biomass, other renew-
ables, and unconventional oil and gas;
moderate the decline of conventional
domestic oil and gas production; and in-
crease access for development of new
resources.
• Integrate energy policy into trade, eco-
nomic, environmental, security, and for-
eign policies; strengthen global energy
trade and investment; and broaden dia-
logue with both producing and con-
suming nations to improve global ener-
gy security.
• Enhance science and engineering capa-
bilities and create long-term opportuni-
ties for research and development in all
phases of the energy supply and de-
mand system.
• Develop the legal and regulatory frame-
work to enable carbon capture and se-
questration. In addition, as policymakers
consider options to reduce CO2 [carbon
dioxide] emissions, provide an effective
global framework for carbon manage-
ment, including the establishment of a
transparent, predictable, economy-wide
cost for CO2 emissions.
9
The purpose of this Policy Analysis is to
demonstrate that all but one of those proposi-
tions—that pertaining to increased access to
government-owned resources—are unsound
suggestions typical of the prevailing energy
debate. Those proposals allegedly derive from
the “hard truths” that the NPC asserts about
the world energy market, which include chal-
lenges to—but also acceptance of—the prevail-
ing political rhetoric. The six hard truths high-
lighted by the NPC report (which I have
numbered for convenience)10 are as follows:
1. Coal, oil, and natural gas will remain
indispensable to meeting total project-
ed energy demand growth.
2. The world is not running out of energy
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resources, but there are accumulating
risks to the continued expansion of oil
and natural gas production from the
conventional sources which historically
relied upon. These risks create signifi-
cant challenges to meeting the total
projected energy demand.
3. To mitigate these risks, expansion of all
economic energy sourceswill be required,
including coal, nuclear, biomass, other
renewables, and unconventional oil and
natural gas. Each of these sources faces
significant challenges, including safety,
environmental, andpolitical or economic
hurdles, as well as imposing infrastruc-
ture requirements for development and
delivery.
4. Energy independence shouldnot be con-
fusedwith strengthening energy security.
The concept of energy independence is
not realistic in the foreseeable future,
whereas U.S. energy security can be
enhanced by moderating demand, ex-
panding and diversifying domestic ener-
gy supplies, and strengthening global
energy trade and investment. There can
be no U.S. energy security without glob-
al energy security.
5. A majority of the U.S. energy sector
workforce, including skilled scientists
and engineers, is eligible to retire within
the next decade. The workforce must be
replenished and trained.
6. Policies aimed at curbing carbon dioxide
emissions will alter the energy mix,
increase energy-related costs, and require
reductions in demand growth.
There is a tension, however, between many
of these hard truths and the NPC policy
responses that follow from them. For instance,
claim (1) is clearly valid, but it should suggest
nonintervention, rather than the intervention
proposed elsewhere in the report. Claim (2)
substitutes for the standard dubious fear of
exhaustion the equally questionable fear of a
worldwide failure to invest adequately in ener-
gy production. Claim (3) similarly is premised
upon the odd idea that dominates the NPC
report thatmarket actors are unable to execute
profitable investments in energy. The first sen-
tence-and-a-half of claim (4) is spot-on. The
last sentence is a truism, and the text in
between ranges from the banal to the indefen-
sible. Clearly, energy imports require an in-
crease in world trade and investment. Yet, no
public policies are needed to produce the pos-
tulated increases in trade and investment. The
claim regarding domestic demand and supply
points crosses the linebetweendescribingwhat
might happen in the marketplace and making
indefensible policy suggestions. Claim (5) is a
statement of fact that has no satisfactory poli-
cy implication. Claim (6) is tautological, and
presages the feebleness with which the report
handles global warming.
Nevertheless, these truthsprovide thebases
for the governmental intervention proposed
by the NPC. This is an ironic outcome. The
report, as the list of truths shows, dissents
from the import fears and resource pessimism
that is popular in other studies, but promotes
new and equally dubious problems that are
marshaled to justify the very same policy pro-
posals that the other efforts advocate.
TheNPC’s case is developed in the first five
chapters of the report, dealing with, in turn,
demand, supply, technology, geopolitics, and
carbon management (the report’s curious
euphemism for global warming):
• The demand chapter moves from a pre-
sentation of forecasts to a call for more
regulations to reduce energy use.
• The supply chapter is predominantly a
review of forecasts and resource-avail-
ability studies into which concerns
about the difficulties of ensuring neces-
sary investment are interwoven.
• The technology chapter ranges over a
variety of options, with the bulk of the
attention given to conventional and
unconventional sources of oil and gas.
Stuck at the beginning is an examination
of thedangers of an inadequate supply of
people who are trained to manage energy
ventures.11
• The geopolitics chapter has little sub-
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stance; it does not distinguish among the
threats that prior writers have seen as rel-
evant to policy; those that are unfortu-
nate, but towhichmarket economies can
adapt; and flights of fancy about oil-
access wars. The NPC displays a faith in
negotiation as a remedy, which makes no
economic sense, and has proved worth-
less in practice.
• The carbon management chapter is so
perfunctory as to have been better omit-
ted.
The NPC report does not merely embrace
the principle of intervention; it advocates con-
tinuation and even extension of the many ill-
advised energy policies that survived the par-
tial deregulations of the 1981–1992 Reagan-
Bush administrations.
The recommendations start by proposing a
tightening of energy-performance standards,
first in motor vehicles and then in the residen-
tial andcommercial sectors.TheNPCalso calls
for related increases in government research
and development, and federal demonstration
projects to highlight better industrial energy-
use techniques.
More critically, later recommendations buy
into the pernicious fallacy that oil is a special
commoditywhoseavailability isheavilyaffected
by political considerations. Without any sup-
porting evidence, the NPC transforms the pos-
sibility of politicization into a near certainty:
The world is entering a period in which
international energy development and
trade are likely to be influencedmore by
geopolitical considerations and less by
the free play of open markets and tradi-
tional commercial interactions among
international energy companies.12
Consequently, the NPC believes that ener-
gy should become a central focus of policy in
every relevant diplomatic realm. The report
calls for the United States government to13
• Integrate energy policy into trade, eco-
nomic, environmental, security, and for-
eign policies by having the Department
of Energy share an equal role with the
Departments of Defense, State, Treasury,
and Commerce on policy issues relating
to energy and energy security.
• Continue to develop the international
energymarketplaceby expanding the ener-
gy dialogue with major consuming and
producingnations, includingChina, India,
Canada,Mexico, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
• Promote an effective global energy mar-
ketplace by sustaining and intensifying
efforts to encourage global adoption of
transparent, market-based approaches
to energy through multilateral and
international institutions—including
the World Trade Organization, G8, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the
International Energy Agency, the Inter-
national Energy Forum, and the Joint
Oil Data Initiative.
• Assist and encourage global adoption of
energy transfer programs and lend-lease
arrangements.
The critical element of the report’s over-
reach is the NPC’s call to subsidize virtually
every energy resource imaginable: enhanced
oil recovery, conventional oil and gas, oil
shale and oil sands, unconventional natural
gas, biomass, coal, and nuclear (solar power
and wind power are praised elsewhere in the
report).14 A mishmash of policies is suggest-
ed to promote those energies. While the NPC
nods toward the need for better federal lands
management policy to facilitate the produc-
tion of energy (with particular attention giv-
en to oil shale, oil sands, and unconventional
natural gas), a report stressing more reason-
able regulation would have been much more
helpful than what appeared.
On the positive side, the report offers a
laudable, but familiar, laundry list of desir-
able attributes for the world energy market.15
Those attributes include
• a competitive market
• stable and diverse supply with minimal
disruptions
4
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• low price volatility
• adequate spare capacity and logistical
infrastructure
• diverse energy mixes
• protection of the global environment,
including climate considerations
• flexibility to accommodate shifting
demand patterns
• transparency and reliability of commer-
cial relationships
The NPC concludes that neglecting these
objectives in a blind pursuit of energy self-
sufficiency would risk unintended andharm-
ful consequences for both energy suppliers
and consumers alike.16 The authors, however,
adopt undesirable proposals to support these
goals. In particular, the NPC seems to believe
that the United States has the ability to con-
vince the world to embrace this vision for
world energymarkets, and the ability to assist
in an attempt to translate that wish into real-
ity.
Common Pitfalls of “Blue Ribbon”
Reports
Unfortunately, the NPC report shares sev-
eral key defects with other recent and earlier
reports, studies, and books that have plowed
this policy terrain.17 The NPC study is simply
one of a long line of ostensibly “blue-ribbon”
reports that say more or less the same thing
and argue more or less from the same foun-
dation. None constitute a serious attempt to
deal with energy issues.
The errors found in these reports are the
inevitable result of the politics of blue-ribbon
panels. They are designed to include a wide
variety of views, make quick decisions, and
are at the mercy of a supporting staff whose
qualifications depend upon the decisions of
the study’s administrators. As subsequent
material should suggest, the competence of
support staff is widely variable. Moreover, the
pressure to rapidly reach a consensus and
unite behind it often produces the bloated
set of proposals criticized here.18
A particularly unfortunate aspect of the
NPC report is that it fails to even provide
what is advertised—the industry’s perspective
on the issues at hand. While the NPC was
once the source of insights from industry
experience, its aggressive use of non-industry
analyses and arguments add external views
that lead to incoherence.
That aside, the primary problem manifest
in the energy reports noted here is their
appalling failure to acknowledge the implica-
tions of past experience. There is nothing
new, for instance, about producer instability,
the search for reliable sources of energy, or
the need for finance and staff for energy
expansion projects. More critically, the his-
torical record shows the inability of govern-
ment to effectively assist industry in meeting
those challenges.
During the energy turmoil of the 1970s,
economists engaged in a great effort to critical-
ly examine the then-prevailing energyproblems
and the policies adopted as reactions to those
problems. The basic conclusion was that no
valid economic defenses existed for the inter-
ventions thatwere adopted. Somecontroversial
arguments were made for alternative interven-
tions, but theyhavenot stoodup.Nothing that
has occurred since then has altered these con-
clusions. Unfortunately, too many commenta-
tors have forgotten previous work on these
issues.
TheNPC report—like the other studies and
reports mentioned above—also pays too little
attention to the underlying economics of
energy. While a report to a general audience
maydownplayorpopularize the technical eco-
nomic issues, the implicit failure to recognize
the issues in play is unacceptable. At times, the
NPC, unlike other studies, does state—albeit
without elaboration—purported economic
rationales for its proposals. None of those jus-
tifications, however, are persuasive.19 That
should not surprise: the passion to act regu-
larly inspires neglect of those economic princi-
ples that undermine the case. Regardless, what
was intended as a fresh look at energy issues
repeats chronic errors.
TheNPC report, likemost others, errs dou-
bly by advocating inferior, and, in the critical
international-oil case, totally ineffective cor-
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rective measures of a type identical to those
proposed in the Cheney report. Thus, even
were the problems real, the proffered policy
agenda would not correct them.
The Underlying Economics of Energy
The discussion that follows offers a sum-
mary of the underlying economics literature
on energy markets and governmental inter-
vention in the same and contrasts those find-
ings with the main arguments offered in the
energy agendas advocated by the most popu-
lar public reports.
First, I deal with the economics of oil-im-
port dependence, the main concern of most of
these blue ribbon reports. The oil-dependence
danger is the subject of an extensive, but spe-
cialized, literature. Both economic theory and
actual experience suggest that the present hys-
teria is unwarranted.
Next, I turn to the alleged shortcomings
of capitalmarkets, which is the only plausible
economic basis for public policy to address
energy depletion. These concerns have right-
ly become a backwater of economic analysis;
economists have abandoned their concerns
over the issue.
Following that, I address the environmen-
tal impact of energy consumption, a well-
established interest of modern economists. As
with all environmental issues, however, eco-
nomicsonly can suggestwhat todo, given that
the impacts from man-made global warming
are conclusively established to exist and prove
harmful.
Then, I consider the implications of imper-
fect information in energy markets and
whether intervention to reduce energy con-
sumption is warranted by the same. Markets
areperfectly capableofdealingwithmost ifnot
all information-related problems in both theo-
ry and practice.
Next, I briefly discuss the current obses-
sion with speculators and the impact of mar-
ketmanipulationon energy prices.While this
issue has been neglected in the blue-ribbon
reports discussed in this paper, it reappears
regularly in energy policy debates and is a
manifestation of economic illiteracy.
After that, I consider the importance of
selecting the appropriate remedies for identi-
fiedproblems.Theallegedproblemshighlight-
ed by the NPC can be better and more directly
addressed by straightforward interventions
that were never considered by the NPC and
similar studies. This is another example of the
unanalytic, ahistorical devotion to pet reme-
dies that mars current energy policy discus-
sions. These errors are another consequence of
arguing without considering the relevant eco-
nomics. Rather than first-best responses, the
NPC report embraces (at best) third- or fourth-
best responses that will fall short of their poli-
cy mission, introduce unintended conse-
quences that complicate markets even further,
or do both.
Finally, I examine the difficulty involved in
remedying market failures with government
intervention, even when those market failures
clearly exist. The NPC report, like almost all
other such reports, is quick to argue that mar-
kets fail on a wide range of fronts, yet implicit-
ly assumes that government remedies to mar-
ket failures never misfire. A vast literature
proves exactly the opposite.
Oil Import Problems in
the Economics Literature
Starting well before the oil turmoil of the
1970s, economists have found oil to be a
major area for study. An enormous literature
exists, and more accumulates on a regular
basis. The material ranges over many issues
and cannot be fully reported or reviewed here.
The single most critical contribution has
been that of ProfessorM. A. Adelman ofMIT.
Starting in the 1960s, he undertook a com-
prehensive examination of the underlying
economics of world oil and how it was affect-
ed by public policies around the world. His
classic synthesis book reached completion
just as the oil turmoil broke.20 Two decades
later, he critically chronicled the evolution of
oil markets from 1970 through the after-
math of the first Gulf War, with a particular
focus on the behavior of oil-exporting coun-
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tries.21 Adelman was by no means the only
economist to explore this terrain—and many
continue to work in these vineyards at pre-
sent—but his contributions have proven the
most important.
An interesting parallel to Adelman’s work
was produced by President Nixon’s Cabinet
Task Force on Oil Import Control.22 This was
one of those rare government studies that seri-
ously examined the issues. The effort received
first-rate staffing, and sought and received
excellent input on the issues. Several leading
energyeconomistsprovidedconsultingreports,
and interested parties were invited to provide
input. The result was an impressive review of
the issues, focusing on the centrality of foster-
ing and preserving competition in oil and the
unsuitability of the then-existing import quota
system for oil. Unfortunately, the advice was
ignored.
Numerous reviews of import dangers and
policy have since emerged with important
contributions by economists at Resources for
the Future, such as Milton Russell, Douglas
Bohi, Michael Toman,23 and, most recently,
Ian Parry.24 The fascination with government
oil stockpiles produced several efforts.25 The
macroeconomic implications of oil-supply
shocks have also received a great deal of atten-
tion. Professor James Hamilton at the Uni-
versity of California, San Diego, is the most
quoted advocate of the argument that oil
shocks cause major macroeconomic disloca-
tions, but, as sketched below, many have con-
curred or dissented.26 The most comprehen-
sive synthesis of oil economics and public
policy, however, was produced by energy
economist Robert L. Bradley Jr.27
Economics vs. Politics inWorld Crude
Oil Markets
A long-standing conflict prevails between
those who believe that the world oil supply is
primarily driven by the conventional eco-
nomic objective of wealth maximization, and
thosewhobelieve that political influences are
dominant. Neither view, however, should be
pushed to its logical limits.
Proponents of the economic view generally
recognize that at least one important depar-
ture fromwealthmaximization has arisen: the
nationalization of the oil industry within
OPEC countries during the 1970s. The ability
of national oil companies to hire foreign man-
agers, combined with prior efforts by OPEC
members to arrange that its domestic work-
force secured training in petroleum industry
management, ensured that operations were
not undermined. Investment decisionmaking,
on the other hand, was harmfully altered.
During the private-ownership oil regime, for-
eign contractors concentrated on making
profitable investments in capacity mainte-
nance and addition. With nationalization,
however, the funds derived from oil produc-
tion became part of a national pool of wealth,
and oil investments had to compete with oth-
er governmental priorities. The effects of this
on the industry illustrate the fallacy of reliance
on allegedly superior governmental invest-
ment skills (an issue to which I return later).28
One clear consequence of an economics-
based view of oil is that if oil policy is governed
by national self-interest, the engagement with
producers—so beloved among politicians and
theNPC—isatbest awasteof time, andatworst
an arrogant presumption of superior knowl-
edge. Exporting, if profitable, will be undertak-
en whatever foreign diplomats may suggest.
Conversely, unprofitability precludes exports.29
Akeypointhere is that, todate, thedanger from
imports has been of temporary disruption of
supplies due to some local crisis.30 This is a
manageable problem that free-market institu-
tions could have handled if they had not been
thwarted by intervention (another matter to
which I will return later). Eliminating or even
sharply reducing oil imports is not a sensible
response to such short-term disruptions.
It is premature to postulate and respond to
the risk of longer-term supply disruptions.
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of plausible long-
term threats. The advantages of oil trade to
buyers and sellers are powerful incentives for
both to maintain flows. Oil is more easily
extracted, transported, transformed, and uti-
lized than any other fuel. Rival energy sources
are so costly that they prevent the energy tran-
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sitions so eagerly advocated by many com-
mentators. The resulting revenues to produc-
ing countries dwarf what they can earn else-
where.
A classic illustration was Richard Nixon’s
call for energy independence. Fortunately, the
old Federal Energy Administration assembled
a team of bright young operations researchers
to synthesize the numerous studies commis-
sioned to support the Project Independence
initiative. Their well-designed (but necessarily
very oversimplified) model nicely quantified
what experienced energy observers sensed: the
nature of petroleum use with its heavy con-
centration in the transportation sector makes
substitution extremely expensive.31
Conversely, the political theory of produc-
er behavior bears a strong resemblance to
what economists call the “managerial-slack
model” of firm behavior. In that model, pro-
ducers supposedly have sufficiently limited
objectives, so that they sacrifice opportuni-
ties for wealth maximization. The political
theory of producer behavior, however, has
the same inherent implausibility as the slack
theories that it resembles.32
More critically, the key example cited to
buttress the argument that politics drives pro-
ducerbehavior—thepurportedAraboil embar-
go of 1973—implies no such thing. First, there
wasnoembargobecause selective embargosare
infeasible.33 Once oil hits the high sea, its desti-
nation cannot be controlled. Moreover, an
embargoednation can easily shift toother sup-
pliers. Adelman’s classic 1995 analysis of world
oil argues thatwhateverproductionreductions
that were undertaken were motivated by a
desire to force up oil prices rather than by a
desire to punish anyone for support of Israel.
Further evidence is provided by the effects
of the critical revolutions in Iraq, Libya, and
Iran, in which rulers who were friendly to the
West were replaced by rulers who were hostile
to the West. Aside from the later years of
Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq, those hostile
rulers were at least as dedicated as their prede-
cessors to the maintenance of oil supplies.34
Even Saddam Hussein’s attacks on Iran in
1979, and Kuwait in 1991, had wealth-maxi-
mizing aspects. To be sure, the moves were
motivated by ancient enmities. However, the
efforts could also be construed as oil grabs
based on ill-conceived beliefs that more oil
wealth could be secured cheaply.
Similarly, Adelman’s 1995 book convinc-
ingly demonstrates that the special relation
with Saudi Arabia is a sham. Saudi Arabia, as
should be expected, does what is in its eco-
nomic interest, which rarely means doing
what the United States wants.35 No vision of
oil-exporter restraint from wealth maximiza-
tion implies either that good relations are
needed to ensure supply or that the exporters
are susceptible to cajoling.
The nadir of this stress on diplomacy was
the notorious 1971 Tehran negotiations.36 As
was ultimately learned by reporters from
Forbes, the State Department, apparently
under the leadership of its long-time energy
advisor James Akins, pushed through a pro-
ducer-consumer deal that allowed major
increases in oil prices, ostensibly as a means of
heading off even larger price increases. Adel-
man argued that the government’s timidity
would unleash even more vigorous efforts to
raise oil prices closer to a monopoly-profit-
maximizing level. The 1973-74 oil price spiral
was the realization of Adelman’s warnings.37
As Adelman also warned, what has been
critical is the oil dependence of these coun-
tries. Most possess nothing else that can pro-
duce significant incomes.Others have become
so dependent on oil that other industries lie
fallow. Maximizing wealth and spending the
proceeds is far more rewarding to producer
states than the capricious political manipula-
tion of markets.
Some have suggested, at least tacitly, that
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism profound-
ly alters the situation.That suggestion rests on
at least two critical implicit assumptions: first,
that because fundamentalists are willing to
harm fellow Muslims, radical fundamentalist
governments would take the ultimate step—
avoided by the Iranian fundamentalists—of
dooming Islamic nations by ceasing oil pro-
duction; and second, that these fundamental-
ists have good prospects to assume power in
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many oil-producing states. A possible third
tacit assumption is that the strategy of eco-
nomic suicide could not be resisted any more
than a scorpion could resist stinging the
proverbial frog that was carrying it across the
water.While all thismight occur, it appears far
too wild a possibility to be the core of nation-
al energy policies. Moreover, it is unlikely that
any good strategy exists to prepare for this
doomsday.
The belief that oil producers are motivated
by political considerations breeds the belief
that some set of policies can ensure favorable
access to oil relative to other customers. Of
course, in markets governed by economic
principles, access is secured by paying the pre-
vailing market price, regardless of how com-
petitive the market may be. With textbook-
pure competition, everyone is a price taker,
buying or selling what is economic at the pre-
vailing market price. With imperfect competi-
tion, some sellers and buyers may affect the
price, but sellers will still sell to all at whatever
price results from the interaction.38
Logic and experience suggests that the
search for favorable access is an exercise in
futility. All parties in the oil trade face enor-
mous pressures not to indulge in favoritism.
By definition, favoritism is bad for the pro-
ducing companies and countries. Favoritism
can only mean selling to less remunerative
outlets. Even the consuming countries suffer
the consequences of diversion from what
may be actual or potential allies.
Reality, however, has not prevented pursuit
of special relations with oil producers. The
classic illustration was the maneuvering to
secure rights to develop oil in the Middle East.
The first important case was the British gov-
ernment’s purchase of the company that was
developing Iranian oil resources (the predeces-
sor of today’s BP).39 The key symbolic start of
the United States’ embrace of the political-
relations approach to oil was Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s 1945 visit with Saudi Arabian king
Ibn Saud. Other forms of deals have arisen.
France and Japan have likewise engaged in
futile efforts to establish special relations with
oil producers. Current Chinese efforts simply
repeat past errors and are thus of nogreat con-
cern. No evidence exists that these arrange-
ments have ever affected product allocations.
The NPC raises an alternative, more ger-
mane worry regarding access: the willingness
of governments to allow the development of
oil and gas resources. A good example of this
problem is the reluctance of the United
States government to lease oil-development
rights on federal land and in coastal waters.
This is surely the best policy analysis in the
NPC report. It gets lost, however, in the bar-
rage of mostly questionable suggestions else-
where in the report, particularly the move to
infer similar reluctance in the rest of the
world.
In sum, the economic view of oil advocated
here holds for the primacy of economic goals,
recognizes that oil markets generate vast rev-
enues that may be and indeed often are mis-
used, and acknowledges that the feasible
options open to the United States and other
major oil consumers are limited to avoiding
incentives to rig markets. Given that oil-mar-
ket behavior is determined by the exporting
countries’ perception of what the market will
permit, it is fantasy to believe that oil-import-
ing countries can redirect the policies of oil-
exporting countries. Countries cannot be per-
suaded to ignore their economic interests. It is
equally unrealistic to believe that dialogue will
improve these countries’ knowledge ofmarket
realities. If anything, their record in market
perception far excels that of consuming-coun-
try governments. That should not be a sur-
prise. Exporting-country survival depends on
realism about markets. Consuming-country
governments, in contrast, are essentially by-
standers to decisions made by their citizens.
These governments thus face little or no pres-
sure to be correct.
A related form of wishful thinking is that
consuming-country governments can per-
suade oil-exporting countries to eliminate the
many undesirable ways in which oil money is
used. These misuses are broad and real. They
include corruption, support of destabilizing
activities in other countries, and overinvest-
ment in armaments. Given the strong forces
9
It is fantasy to
believe that
oil-importing
countries can
redirect the
policies of
oil-exporting
countries.
3580_PA628_1stClass:3580_PA628_1stClass  11/17/2008  8:06 AM  Page 9
that lead to such excesses, it is futile to expect
that external criticism will have any impact.
Import Dangers Revisited
Before dealing with specific issues related
to oil imports, various views on the subject
require our attention. Among the studies
criticized here, the 2006 Council on Foreign
Relations Task Force has the clearest and
fullest listing of the problems widely believed
to be associated with excessive reliance on
foreign oil. The task force saw six dangers:
1. “The control over enormous oil rev-
enues gives exporting countries the
flexibility to adopt policies that oppose
U.S. interests and values.” (p. 26)
2. “Oil dependence causes political realign-
ments that constrain the ability of the
United States to form partnerships to
achieve common objectives.” (p. 26)
3. “High prices and seemingly scarce sup-
plies create fears—especially evident in
Beijing and New Delhi, as well as in Euro-
pean capitals and in Washington—that
the current system of open markets is
unable to ensure a secure supply.” (p. 27)
4. “Revenues from oil and gas exports can
undermine local governance.” (p. 28)
5. “A significant interruption in oil supply
will have adverse political and economic
consequences in theUnitedStates and in
other importing countries.” (p. 29)
6. “Some observers see a direct relation-
ship between the dependence of the
United States on oil, especially from the
Persian Gulf, and the size of the U.S.
defense budget.” (p. 29)
This list is characteristically problematic in
its failure to distinguish between what is dis-
turbing but uncorrectable and that to which a
sensible response is possible. Danger (1) is a
much-repeated irrelevance. As noted earlier,
there is nothing the United States can do to
affect the situation. At best, any strategies that
lower oil priceswill lessen thepower todomis-
chief.Danger (2) expresses anold concern that
others will be more unwise than the United
States in seeing and trying to counteract polit-
ical forces in oil markets. Danger (3) then pos-
tulates an unfamiliar proposition that others
alsowill bemore errant in perceivingwhat dri-
ves the market. Danger (4) is another example
of the untenable belief that the quality of for-
eign governments matters to and is cor-
rectable by, the United States. Danger (5)
ignores the fact that supply disruptionswould
have the same effect on a nation regardless of
how much oil it imports. Danger (6) is a
strange, unhelpful twist on an old argument.
Instead of deploring security costs, we worry
that others fear the existence of these security
costs. Adirect considerationof security costs is
preferable.
In contrast, Bohi and Toman’s much more
critical survey of the economics of oil imports
identifies three relevant policy issues: the
potentially reducible effects of higher oil
prices, the macroeconomic effects, and the
effects on the military budget.40 A discussion
of each follows below.
World Oil Prices and U.S. Policy
In the early 1970s, both Professor Adelman
and the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import
Control concluded that the main concern of
theUnitedStateswhen it comes tooilmarkets
is to ensure that there is vigorous competition
in those markets. This was precisely what was
not being done at the time. The United States
had for years protected the domestic oil-pro-
ducing industry by imposing quotas on oil
imports.41 Denied theopportunity to compete
for sales in U.S. markets, exporters turned to
market-rigging operations.
The infamous oil negotiations in 1971,
first with Libya and then in Tehran with the
Middle Eastern producers, were the great
turning point. Adelman’s initial view was
that the negotiations produced price-rigging
policies that would have been avoided had
exporter demands been resisted, but he later
noted that perhaps the outcome would have
arisen in any case. In any event, the federal
government’s ambivalence about competi-
tion in oil markets made the creation of a car-
tel easier.
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Since 1971, the oil-exporting countries
have secured sharply higher but volatile prices.
Some analysts argued, particularly in the early
yearsofhighprices, that thosehighpriceswere
less the product of production constraint by
the cartel than they were the product of
endogenous shifts in global supply and
demand that would have occurred whether
the cartel existed or not.42 Subsequent experi-
ence, however, indicates that the cartel has, in
fact, had a hand in those price fluctuations. In
particular, market behavior involved price col-
lapses and spikes without major changes in
the underlying demand or supply. Adelman
nicely epitomized the situation as one of a
clumsy cartel.43
The reason that the cartel exhibits “clum-
siness” is because OPEC member states often
disagree about cartel strategy, exhibit an on-
again, off-again commitment to agreed-upon
production quotas, and lack conclusive
information about how far they can push the
market on price at any given time. Thus,
prices have cycled widely and wildly. The cur-
rent worldwide oil price boom, for instance,
followed years of historically low prices.
Several ideas have been forwarded to coun-
teract the power of the OPEC cartel, but the
only credible idea that has arisen is an oil-
import-quota auction.That idea,whichgained
some academic traction in the 1970s, has its
roots in the venerable international trade theo-
ry concept of an optimal tariff. The case for an
oil-import-quota auction follows from the fact
that large consuming nations collectively have
monopsony (buyers’ monopoly) power. Theo-
retically, one could impose a tariff that restricts
imports and lowers prices receivedby exporters
to their monopsony-optimum level, or else
that optimum-import level could be set as a
quota.
Several problems arise, however, in imple-
menting such an optimum tariff or quota.
First, determining the proper import level is
beyond the capabilities of any government
anywhere. Second, protectionist instincts may
lead to excessively high restrictions. Third,
exporters might retaliate and trigger a world-
wide trade war. Fourth, a great power seeking
to foster international trade sets a very bad
example by engaging in opportunistic restric-
tions. The United States has undertaken too
many unjustified interventions, such as in
steel and automobiles; piling on more is not
desirable.
The quota auction variant of this idea was
proposed largely to exploit a weakness inher-
ent in all cartels. The fundamental insight
here is that if cheating on cartel production
quotas can be concealed, cartel members will
be more willing to cheat. Hence, auctions for
export rights to consuming nations would be
in the form of sealed bids with the results
kept secret. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that
the secrets in question could be kept.
The many and varied problems associated
with and an oil-import-quota auction have
largely (and rightly) killed interest in the idea.
The clearest advice for consuming states that
remains unscathed is that they do nothing to
obstruct the flow of oil in world markets. The
NPC recognizes, but does not analyze, what is
always at the core of world oil issues—the com-
petitiveness of themarket. TheNPC’s stress on
diplomatic approaches, as noted, is an unreal-
istic response to the challenge of stimulating
competition. What is really needed is to do
nothing to create fears ofmarket-access restric-
tion. In short, the biggest danger of imports is
the hysteria about them and the market-dis-
rupting measures proposed as cures.
TheMacroeconomics of Oil
Another hearty perennial is that oil-price
instability, supposedly exaggerated by depen-
dence on oil imports, has severe adversemacro-
economiceffects. Inparticular, it is said tocause
the simultaneous appearance of inflation and
unemployment. As sketched below, academics
have conducted extensive investigations of this
matter, and a wide range of views has arisen.
Unfortunately, formidable econometric prob-
lems arise in separating out the impacts of oil-
price increases from those of other factors, par-
ticularly monetary policy. The most recent
work, nevertheless, seems skeptical about the
argument that major macroeconomic impacts
follow from oil-price volatility.
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Any discussion of this issue must be
anchored in the revolution inmacroeconomics
that occurred in the 1970s and initiated the
third phase of the evolution of macroeconom-
ics.44 Prior to the appearance of John Maynard
Keynes’s General Theory in 1936, economic
instability was treated in a fragmentary, unsys-
tematic basis. Keynes provided the basis for a
more systematic framework.45 His own formu-
lation was very loose, but several commenta-
tors, particularly J. R. Hicks, prepared formal-
ization that transformedKeynes’ ideas into the
Keynesian model of macroeconomics.46
The second evolution was the rise of the
monetarist school of macroeconomics, most
notably advanced by Milton Friedman, Karl
Brunner, and Allan H. Meltzer. Friedman, in
collaboration with Anna Schwartz, produced
a massive history of U.S. monetary policy that
argued that it was inept monetary policy
rather than some breakdown of the capitalist
system that had caused economic instability,
particularly the great depression of 1929–33.47
Monetarists argued that monetary policy was
more influential than fiscal policy in deter-
mining the course of macroeconomic events,
which directly contravened much of the
Keynesian perspective. This contention had
enormous influence with many leading econ-
omists who accepted the findings.
The third evolution of macroeconomic
thought was ushered in by a group of younger
economists led by Robert Lucas,48 Thomas
Sargent, and Neil Wallace.49 They incorporat-
edprinciples fromtraditional economics, such
as good foresight and rapid market clearing
into macroeconomic thought. Taken to its
outer limits, this “rational expectations” ap-
proach implies that economic instability will
not arise, and, if it did, intervention to reverse
instability would not work. While these theo-
ries are heavily criticized for assuming far
moreknowledge that actually exists, that is the
point. Economic instability is no longer inher-
ent, but comes from precisely what economic
theory cannot handle: unanticipated changes
in public policy.
All this matters to theories of oil-price
shocks and economic instability because the
newer theories aremuch less supportive of the
idea that oil-price instability can induce
macroeconomic shocks. Economists Ben
Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson,
for instance, conducted an econometric
analysis and found that the macroeconomic
impact of oil-price shocks has historically
been caused by improper monetary responses
to the shock and that a more stable monetary
policy couldhave avoided the harms.50 Robert
Barsky and Lutz Kilian likewise found that
bad monetary policy, rather than oil shocks,
caused the stagflation of the 1970s.51
In sum, while the debate has not been set-
tled, concerns about oil shocks have been
greatly lessened. The literature on oil shocks
reveals that formidable problems exist, in
both establishing a convincing theoretical
analysis regarding why macroeconomic im-
pacts arise, and then econometrically testing
the subsequent theories. The weak theoretical
support for the fear that oil-price shocks can
trigger significant macroeconomic deteriora-
tion, combined with the formidable difficul-
ties in isolating the effect of oil-price shocks
on the economy as a whole, inspires skepti-
cism about oil-shock theories. Certainly, the
theories do not support reducing imports in
the hope that the shocks will be sufficiently
less profound in order to justify the large,
clearly extant costs associated with import
restrictions.
At present, the main U.S. policy for
addressing the macroeconomic risk of oil-
price shocks is the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve, a public inventory of crude oil that
would theoretically be available during such
shocks. Thus, doubts about the dangers asso-
ciated with those shocks weaken the case for
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. An alterna-
tive explanation for the alleged suboptimal
level of private oil inventories is that the regu-
lar imposition of price controls discourages
optimal inventory levels and that a public
stockpile can compensate for this.52 The previ-
ously cited literature on stockpiling, however,
suggests that considerable problems exist in
ensuring optimal release of public inventories.
This led me to conclude that the fundamental
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problemwaspolitical fear ofwindfall profits.53
As Taylor and Van Doren observed, this is a
fundamental defect for which no credible cor-
rective action exists.54 Every indication is that
the error of controlling prices will be repeated.
Thus, the stockpile has no satisfactory justifi-
cation.
Investment Myopia and
the End of Oil:
The Theory and Practice of
Energy Transition
People who are alarmed about trends in
energy markets commonly contend that a
decline of oil production is impending, yet pri-
vate investors are not correctly anticipating
this development. These assertions inevitably
link back to M. King Hubbert’s inadvertently
prescient prediction of a decline in U.S. oil
production. Hubbert’s analysis, however, was
based on a statistical appraisal of the physical
availability of oil in the United States, not in
the world as a whole.
In practice, economic limits to production
kick inwell before geological limits, and that is
what happened in the United States. Oil pro-
duction declined, not because of depletion,
but because a superior (less-costly) alterna-
tive—Middle Eastern oil—arose. The peak was
reached later thanwas desirable because of the
federal government’s policy of restricting oil
imports. Thus, it was dumb luck that the pat-
tern of decline dictated by changing energy
policymatchedwhatHubbert expected due to
physical limits.
The imperfect-foresight argument, in gen-
eral, is an absurdity. To believe that govern-
ments are better anticipators of the future
than private investors ignores the vast record
demonstrating the contrary.55 This is particu-
larly true of the extreme pro-government
claims discussed further below. These views
posit a government dispassion and wisdom
that is lacking in the private sector. Experience
shows the opposite. The private sector has the
advantage of a multiplicity of actors whose
survival depends on correct decisions. In theo-
ry, things might be so unpredictable that dis-
astermight arise fromsudden changes thatno
one could foresee. This is unlikely in energy.
The participants are always concerned about,
and act to anticipate, future developments.
The large size and profitability of oil compa-
nies reflects their skills at appraising pros-
pects. If the companies fail, no one else will do
better.
An alternative view employs an often used
but wildly implausible concept of market fail-
ure–thebelief thatmarket actorswill not estab-
lishenoughprocedures tohedge risksandthus
will produce inefficiently low levels of invest-
ment. Ronald Coase’s point (see below) about
the costs associated with transactions such as
hedging is the critical analytic response to the
criticism.56 Every possible risk is not hedged
simply because most of them are too small to
justify establishing protective measures.
The facts are even more devastating. The
years since World War II have seen the rise of
a vast array of new financial instruments.
Mutual-fund companies have introduced a
stunning variety of options that differ in the
extent of their active management, whether
stocks, bonds, or other assets are involved,
what countries are included; in what sectors
of the economy investments are made; and in
which markets the shares are purchased.
Futures markets emerged for crude oil when
the major oil companies lost their oil conces-
sions from OPEC nations.
Moreover, improving foresight does not
necessarily translate into reducing oil produc-
tion, let alone support the conclusion that
peak oil is near. To discuss this issue intelli-
gently, a review of the underlying and exten-
sive literature on exhaustible-resource man-
agement is necessary.
The first widely cited item in the literature
is an article by L. C. Grey in 1914.57 Sub-
sequent writers made Harold Hotelling’s 1931
article on the subject the iconic starting point
of the literature.58 In the 1960s, however, nat-
ural-resource economists such as Anthony
Scott,59 Orris Herfindahl,60 Richard Gordon,61
and particularly Ronald Cummings,62 made
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the critical contributions that produced the
essence of this theory.63
Hotelling’s theory explains the optimal
behavior of a producer who is producing a
good in which supply is fixed by nature. If the
demand for that good persists long enough so
that it is profitable to hoard output, then it is
no longer optimal to sell at a price equal to the
marginal cost of production. Instead—because
there would be later periods in which, because
of depletion, no demands could be met—opti-
mally restricting the earlier output to meet
these later demands would be profitable. As a
few expositions of the theory have noted,
should that critical timeofunsatisfieddemand
be nonexistent or simply at a sufficiently dis-
tant date, efficient current behavior would
ignore the eventual depletion.64
When depletion comes nearer, wealth-max-
imizing resource owners would respond by
restricting output to provide for later genera-
tions.However, contrary tomany or evenmost
treatments of Hotelling, this would not pro-
duce a simple, readily observable impact on
prices.65 When dealing with homogenous re-
sources producible at constant costs,Hotelling
argued that the “net price” (the average profit
per unit of output) would rise at the market
rate of interest.66 With pure competition in
mineral rights, those rents would be paid as
royalties. However, because production incurs
costs, the market price would necessarily grow
at a slower rate than profits.
Other work found that resource hoarding
can produce two further economic rewards.
First, Grey’s pioneering effort stressed that
with the standard assumption of increasing
marginal costs, output reductions raised prof-
its by lowering marginal costs. Extensions of
Hotelling’s general case showed that a further
rewardarises if resources areheterogeneous. In
that case, reducing output delays the increas-
ing costs of cumulative production. Several
writers demonstrated that the benefit of delay-
ing thedepletionof “better” resourceswas sim-
ply the sum of the present values of the result-
ing cost savings. While this is an unsurprising
result, much effort went into its derivation.67
While this analysis usually implies rising
prices and falling output over time, those out-
comesarenot inevitable.Rapidbutdecelerating
shifts in demand or rapid downward shifts in
costs might lead to rising output.68 Thus,
Hotelling’sargument that thenetpriceof fixed-
supply goods would rise at the market rate of
interest degenerates into the general proposi-
tion that something is valuable, and thus an
asset, only if some combination of immediate
paymentsandcapitalgainsgivesanoverall yield
at least equal to the market rate of interest.
The critical point here is that exhaustibility
introduces no new market failures into the
market. If the assumptions for pure competi-
tion prevail, response to exhaustion is effi-
cient. To make matters worse, the impacts of
market failure differ depending upon the fail-
ure in question. Monopoly still usually pro-
duces inefficiently low output; detrimental
externalities still lead to excess output. Imper-
fect capital markets, if interpreted narrowly,
might imply excessive output. However, this
proves not to be true in general.
The economic interpretation of the claim
thatmarket actorsdemonstrate inadequate con-
cern for the future is thatmarket actors demand
toohigharateof returnon investment.69 Asnot-
ed earlier, in a simple ex-haustible-resourcemod-
el, concern for the future inspires hoarding of
supply for future generations of consumers.70
Requiringinvestmenttoproduceaveryhighrate
of return has the direct effect of making hoard-
ing less attractive. If inefficiently high interest
rates are reduced, oil production may indeed be
slowed because of increased incentives not to
produce.
However, this can be counteracted by the
increased incentives that would arise to invest
in and operate new producing capacity. An
indirect effect of raising the interest cost ofuti-
lizing equipment discourages investment in
and utilization of producing capacity. Neither
effect will always outweigh the other. For pro-
ducers that are hoarding so much that prices
are well above current production costs, a
higher interest rate reduces the attractiveness
ofhoarding.When costs are closer toprice, the
investment-disincentive effect dominates.71
In any case, the theory indicates what
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would happen if demand for a physically lim-
ited material lasts forever. Some have argued
that it is thus a useless theory. It is better to
contend that the theory, properly used, pro-
vides guidance about whether exhaustion is a
pressing problem. The presence or absence of
the expected results thus gives evidence of the
importance of exhaustion.
Contrary to some assertions oftenmade in
the early years of oil-price increases (see
above), oil-exporter behavior is better ex-
plained by theories of cartelization than of
exhaustion. Exhaustion theory implies that
decisionswill be consistent over time and that
unilateral producer action is, if anything,
preferable. The opportunity to hoard exists
whatever other producers do, and indeed, the
less that others hoard, the more the actual
hoarders benefit. In contrast, cartelization
requires coordination. Consistent behavior
also is preferable to those hoping to cartelize,
but the theory and practice of cartelization
indicates that differences among potential
participants often lead to breakdowns.72 The
fitful path of oil prices since 1971 is clear evi-
dence that unstable cartelization is the most
likely situation.
Of course, discussions about oil scarcity
are heavily affected by the inherent lack of
hard data. For good economic reasons, data
on the long-run availability of oil and other
minerals do not exist. Information on what is
knowable, current production and actually
developed (proved), is often hard to come by
(particularly data from fields governed by
members of the OPEC cartel), and all the
data are characterized by terms that are
sometimes quite unclear or misleading.
However, Adelman’s work in the area tacitly
treats the issues.73 He first notes the critical
distinction between exploration and develop-
ment. Exploration is the initial and far less
costly step of locating potentially valuable
mineral deposits. Development is the much
more expensive step of constructing the facil-
ities needed to extract the minerals. Adelman
suggests that exploration is steadily under-
taken to build up a backlog of sites that are
potentially worth developing. Then, as justi-
fied, the locale is developed. Such develop-
ment can continue for decades, and indeed
even centuries, as conditions dictate.
He argues that exploration is an ongoing
activity, driven not by fear of depletion, but by
recognition that good opportunities to
reduce costs may exist. Exploration and devel-
opment are limited to serving immediate
opportunities to produce.
Given this, the actual endowment of most
minerals is unknown. What is known is the
amount of proved reserves—the amount in
developed deposits and the prospects for
developing more. Neglect of this fundamen-
tal point perennially produces concern, often
reaching hysteria, on resource availability.
Indicators also exist about the vast physi-
cal availability of several alternatives to oil
and natural gas such as coal, oil shale, tar
sands, uranium supplies as extended by
breeder reactors, hydrogen, wind, and solar.
The broad prediction that ultimately the
world economy will move to one or more of
these alternatives is probably correct but of
no practical value. We simply lack knowledge
of what the optimum outcome will be.
Neither the identity of the preferred options
nor the timing of the transition is knowable.
Moreover, the failure as yet to adopt these
options reflects the current relatively plenti-
ful supply of oil rather than short-sighted-
ness.
In any case, the situation produces much
speculation. Two broad classes of scenarios
emerge. In one case adopted by theNPC,mov-
ing through coal and perhaps shale and tar
sand is undertaken before moving to one or
more non-fossil alternatives. Others would
skip the first stage. Clearly, the differences lie
in views of the overall economics of the alter-
natives. A critical consideration is whether or
not thedirect costs of the fossil alternatives are
low enough to outweigh the perceived high
environmental costs.
In sum, the theory and practice of deple-
tion strongly indicate that a market solution
is vastly superior to government interven-
tion.
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Environmental Issues
Dealing with environmental issues such as
global warming is tricky because the central
issues lie far outside economics. However,
neglect is inappropriate because important
economic considerations exist.
The case for altering fuel-use practices to
fight global warming involves several premis-
es. The starting point is that global tempera-
tures are rising. The critical second proposi-
tion is that human activity is a major cause of
these rises. The third is that these tempera-
ture increases are harmful. Fourth, it is pre-
sumed that restricting the heat-raising activ-
ities is the most efficient response. Only the
first of these is well established.
In viewing the debate, it is necessary to get
past the obfuscation regularly used to throttle
discussion. The world does not neatly divide
intodisinterestedpartiesnoblypursuing truth,
justice, and the American way and interest
groups with selfish aims. It is more realistic to
view all participants as possessing an agenda
that they are vigorously pursuing. A “special
interest” charge is a standard tactic to discredit
opposition. Environmental groups have a bias
towards finding damages to the environment.
Governments have a slant toward encouraging
the continuation and expansion of their activi-
ties. Universities want to secure research fund-
ing. Corporations and trade associations
believe that their industries make valuable—
and indeed, indispensable—contributions to
the economy. All this should be viewed suspi-
ciously. All will overdo; some may be right at
times.
Theenvironmentalmovement isparticular-
ly suspect because of its extensive history of
overreach. Leaving aside phony crises such as
DDT, Love Canal, and Alar, alarmist declara-
tions are usually built uponmountains ofmis-
information.74 Certainly,worries aboutdisaster
from the operation of nuclear plants proved
virtually baseless.75 Studies surrounding acid
rain revealed that fears about the effects on
forests and lakes were unjustified.76
When considering the issue of climate
change, onemust always keep inmind the bias
imparted by the dominance of government
support in research financing. That backing
tacitly rests on the presumption that the case
for global warming will be confirmed. Con-
cerns are reinforcedhereby indications that cli-
mate scientists who are not heavily involved in
massive studies are skeptical that human activ-
ities are causing dangerous global warming.77
Whatever the causes, the climatological
effects and their economic consequences are
unclear. The possibility exists that beneficial
effects will dominate. Even if not, Goklany
calculates that mitigating the effects of glob-
al warming will be much cheaper than green-
house gas emission reduction.78
The Economics of
Consumption Regulation
The proposals for regulations to reduce
energy consumption, promote new technolo-
gies, and develop scientific and engineering
capabilities can most charitably be viewed as
imperfect ways to respond to the alleged
under-pricing of oil. An alternative interpre-
tation is that market imperfections cause
inefficient responses even to correct energy
prices. Neither argument is satisfactory.
Two main rationales exist for concerns
over energy-consumption choices. The first is
the inefficient-capital-market contention
just criticized. The second is the assertion
that consumers are inadequately informed
about energy options. This is an argument
with weak theoretic support and unaccept-
able empirical analyses.
Concern about inefficient market response
to price signals has emerged from new acade-
mic efforts to discover ways in which market
outcomes are unsatisfactory.79 The prolifera-
tion of these efforts can be explained by two
phenomena. One is the simple academic pres-
sure to develop new ideas. The other is a desire
to counter the onslaught on oldermarket-fail-
ure theories. Discontent with older claims
about market failure has become vigorous
since at least the 1970s.Many economists now
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are skeptical about our ability to determine
whether inefficiency does or does not prevail
and about the feasibility of devising a satisfac-
tory remedy. So many false accusations and
inappropriate cures have emerged in the past
that skepticism is essential.
Newer concepts of market failure, however,
are considerably more problematic. The new
theories deal with more complex cases than
were previously considered. The most relevant
here are those that purport to demonstrate
that asymmetric information between buyer
and seller often produces unsatisfactory mar-
ket outcomes. A critical way in which the new
theories differ is that, unlike older work that
identified conditions that always led to ineffi-
ciency, these new models deal with situations
that may or may not produce inefficiency.
Whilebotholdandnewtheoriesaredifficult
to verify (and remedy via government interven-
tion), verification is more difficult with these
new theories, in which proof of undesirable
effects is more difficult to ascertain.
The most relevant critique of these newer
theories of market failure is that of Northwest-
ern University economist Daniel Spulber.80
Spulber presents his analysis in two parts. The
first begins by showing, as would be expected,
that no inefficiency arises if the standard
assumptions of pure competition with com-
plete information prevails. The existence of
monopolymayormaynotproduce inadequate
(or excessive) response. The second part deals
with the inefficiencies thatmightarisewithvar-
ious types of knowledge gaps by the partici-
pants. Spulber isquite careful to recognizeboth
that private alternatives to public intervention
exist, andthat theprospects forpublicdesignof
efficient intervention are dubious. He con-
cludes that public supply of information to
remedy asymmetric information is probably
preferable to directly regulating transactions.
If anything, Spulber’s critique of these new
theories does not go far enough; too many of
the analyses that he cites, for instance, postu-
late problems that are unlikely to arise. For
example, Spulber notes Akerlof’s work on the
market forused vehicles, andhowdifficult it is
for buyers to detect “lemons”—a problem that
leads to sub-optimal prices for all used vehi-
cles.81 However, economist Eric Bond’s exami-
nation of the used-truck market suggested
that mechanisms existed to appraise used-
truck quality.82
What is critical here is that these newer the-
ories of market failure apply to transactions
where the relevant knowledge is difficult for
one party to the transaction to secure. This
hardly applies to energy transactions. Con-
sumers can readily determine the energy-use
characteristics of all the energy-using equip-
ment that they purchase (the government per-
haps deserves credit for forcing disclosure).
Once information problems have been solved,
performance mandates (such as automotive
fuel efficiency standards) are indefensible
because they violate basic (and sound) eco-
nomic principles about the optimal manner in
which choices should be made. No one can be
a better judge of what is best than a well-
informed consumer, given that performance
preferences and consumption patterns vary by
individual.Neithergovernmentagencieswitha
mandate to reduce energy consumption nor
conservationists devoted to the cause of less
energy are to be trusted. In short, affection for
performance standards is very bad economics.
Viewing what passes for the empirical litera-
ture on these matters inspires total rejection of
thecase for intervention.Forover threedecades,
assorted research groups have generated paper
studies purporting to prove the existence of
massive amounts of neglected opportunities
that would economically reduce energy con-
sumption. The critical problem is that none of
these groups has experience in implementing
energy choices.83 Thus, the other logical possi-
bility, that these studies are incorrect, seems
more plausible. The situation is not helped by
thewillingnessofconservationists toextendthe
criticism about inefficient energy use beyond
small-scale users to large consumers and prod-
uct producers. These large-scale users have
greater incentives than households to investi-
gate opportunities to reduce energy consump-
tion and have organized to do so.
The academic literature on government
intervention to address these sorts of alleged
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market failures is extensive. A notable review of
electric-utilityenergy-conservationprogramsby
MIT economists Paul Joskow and Donald
Marron found serious flaws in the manner in
which the benefits from these programs were
calculated.84 The central elementof energy-con-
sumptioncontrol—fuel-efficiencystandards for
automotive vehicles (known as corporate-aver-
age-fuel-economy standards, or CAFE), is wide-
ly, but not universally, criticized as undesirable,
even if the alleged market-failure problems pre-
vailed.85 The main problems are effects of the
standards on other aspects of automobile per-
formance, such as safety,86 and the incentives to
increase automobile use from the higher
mileage and thus low per mile travel cost.87
A further drawback, in practice, was creat-
ed by Congress when it established more
stringent rules for automobiles than for light
trucks. As should have been expected, this
spurred the substitution of light trucks for
automobiles, and new types of trucks with
properties more like automobiles emerged.
The literature on CAFE suggests that the
case for such standards critically depends on
massive consumer neglect of the value of fuel
savings. For example, a curiously ambivalent
article written by Resources for the Future
economists Fischer, Harrington, and Parry
shows that with consumer awareness, CAFE is
at best redundant and has negative effects if it
diverts investment from improving other
characteristics ofmotor vehicles. Nevertheless,
the authors support modest tightening of
CAFE because of other supposed benefits that
their analysis did not capture. Those benefits,
however, seem more speculative than the con-
sumer-ignorance arguments, about which the
authors were properly skeptical.88
Big Oil and the Speculators:
The Great Excluded Issues
Politicians often rail against the role played
by large privately owned oil companies and
speculators in energy markets. Blue-ribbon
panels have neglected the subject. In the NPC
case, this was due to the rules to prevent collu-
sion under which the Council operates. The
neglect elsewhere, by definition, indicates that
these other groups found the questions unim-
portant. Given the general ineptitude of these
efforts, dumb luck is as likely an explanation
as a sudden attackof good sense.However, the
persistence of the charge that oil companies
and financial speculators routinely engage in
price fixing, market manipulation, and collu-
sion necessitates mention here.
There is nothingnewabout the complaints
being lodged against “Big Oil” or Wall Street
speculators. Assertions of mischief-making
always arise when speculators are active in
markets undergoing major changes. However,
suchassertionshaveno substance. Efforts dat-
ingback to the1970s and resuming in the21st
century have consistently failed to support
charges of energy market rigging by privately
owned companies operating in the United
States.89 The charges against speculators are
exercises in economic illiteracy. Speculation is
a bet about future prices. The bet can be won
only by correctly predicting prices. These,
moreover, are wagers in games of skill.
Speculators persist because they are adept at
anticipating price trends. Current prices are
affected only if the high futures price inspires
increased stockpiling, which has not been the
case. The attacks on both oil companies and
speculators are simply a demagogic way to
express frustration. Confiscating profits then
removes the incentives of companies and spec-
ulators to apply their skills to the market. The
OPEC countries, which are the real culprits,
are beyond congressional reach, but oil com-
pany executives and financial company execu-
tives must respond to subpoenas.
The Exile of
First-Best Alternatives
Modern economic analysis, particularly in
international trade theory, labors mightily to
match solutions to problems. At least in this
literature, the writers are careful to limit their
attention to policy measures that are normally
employed, and which might work in the cases
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considered.90 Hence, analysts are interested in
picking thepolicy instrument thatmostdirect-
ly solves theprobleminquestion.Analystsonly
consider feasible policy instruments that
would have the desired effect. Thus, discussion
immediatelybeginswithexaminationofwhich
qualitatively feasible policy is best.
In this literature, then, only stimulating
policies are considered when stimulation is
the goal, and similarly, only retarding policies
are considered when restriction is the objec-
tive. For instance, subsidies stimulate that
which is subsidized, while taxes discourage
that which is taxed. Industries not targeted
by the subsidies feel the opposite effect. For
instance, a tax on coal stimulates natural gas.
In thepresent case, the allegedproblems are
dangers of oil imports and of global warming.
Thus, if the fears are valid, the most direct
approaches are to tax imports andgreenhouse-
gas emissions.
Unfortunately, thebundleofpolicy interven-
tions embraced by the NPC and most others in
the business of pontificating about energy poli-
cy does not directly address the identified prob-
lems. For instance, taxes on oil or gasoline, or
fuel efficiency standards for new vehicles, dis-
courage the consumption of both international
and domestic oil. CAFE standards have the fur-
ther drawback of raising the cost of owning a
motor vehicle, but simultaneously lowering the
cost of using that vehicle. It becomes unclear
whether energyusewill rise or fall, and the same
holdstrueforotherperformancestandards.The
wide use of such standards means that they
extend to areas such as electric appliances—and
even toilets—inwhich oil use is negligible. Thus,
they mainly hit domestic consumption of fuels
that, at least in many cases, the usage should
probably be encouraged.
Market Failure vs.
Government Failure
A key aspect of the modern economic the-
ory of intervention is skepticism about
whether governments in fact have the ability
and desire to remedy market failures and
increase efficiency. As a result, theories of
government failure have proliferated.
Columbia economist Jagdish Bhagwati has
neatly summed up the standard uses of mar-
ket-failure arguments as the “puppet government
approach.”91 The old-fashioned textbook gov-
ernment possesses far more prescience and
acceptance of economic principles than do
actualgovernments.Realgovernments lack the
competence and the motivation to increase
efficiency. Moreover, intervention is expensive
to design and operate properly. Thus, the inef-
ficiencies must be great for regulation to be
desirable.
A remarkable article by Ronald Coase, “The
ProblemofSocialCost,” is the critical sourceof
the last point and a much more modern
appraisal of intervention.92 In the essay, Coase
dealt with a much-discussed but badly dated
analysisof “externalities”byA.C.Pigou, a long-
time professor of economics at Cambridge
University. Externalities are the incidental
effects of economic actions on people who are
not directly involved. These can be harmful, as
with pollution and noise, or beneficial, as with
pollination of plants by bees.
Coase emphasized two defects of Pigou’s
analysis. First, Pigou presumed that govern-
ment intervention always was needed, but
Coase provided numerous examples of how
cures to externality problems were secured
privately. Second, Pigou asserted that, when
confronting positive externalities (where by
definition the costs to society were lower
than the costs to the private producers or
consumer), a subsidy to the producer or con-
sumer was appropriate. Conversely, negative
externalities should be taxed. Coase showed
that this also was wrong; subsidizing the
abatement of a detrimental externality would
produce the same result as a Pigouvian tax.
Coase’s insights proved remarkably imper-
vious to criticism. Two potential problems,
however, are evident. First, Coase tacitly
assumes that thebeneficiariesof the taxarenot
so different from the beneficiaries of the sub-
sidy that demands shift. Second, an implicit
further condition of optimum externality
response is that the response should ensure
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that only firmswhose total social value exceeds
their total social costs should survive. The cor-
rect social policy requires additional measures
to attain this goal.93
Coase is well aware that the choice of pol-
icy response affects the welfare of those
involved. By example, he shows that those
harmed by the externality are not always the
ones whom it is appropriate to compensate.
In some cases, these victims knowingly
moved near an existing externality-produc-
ing entity, about which the newcomer should
have been aware.
Coase moves so tersely through the argu-
ments thatmany commentators overlookedor
misunderstood his discussion of why private
action may not resolve the externality prob-
lem.94 Coase argued that when a large number
of people are involved, the transaction costs
associated with providing for a remedy could
prove to be so steep that private action would
be difficult to implement. However, he pre-
sented two objections to the presumption that
such high transaction costs justified govern-
ment action. First, with sufficiently high trans-
action costs, even if the government can act
more cheaply than private groups, the total
costs of intervention will still exceed the bene-
fits. High enough transaction costs can be a
barrier to both private and public externality
remedies. Second, even if this is not true, apub-
lic solution isnotnecessarilypreferable toapri-
vate solution. Given the limitations of govern-
ments, the inefficiencies of a private solution
may be less than those of a public one. In a fol-
low-up article, “The Lighthouse in Econom-
ics,” Coase showed that the traditional asser-
tion that lighthouses were a clear example of a
good that had to be supplied by government
was historically invalid. In the United King-
dom, the government took over lighthouses
only after a private association successfully
established a system of lighthouses.95
GeorgeStigler observed thatCoase’s analysis
applied to all market failures.96 Stigler stressed
that with low enough transaction costs, market
failures could all be overcome privately. Coase’s
caveats about the implications of high transac-
tions also apply to all interventions.
While Coase seems never to have made the
links explicit, these arguments are closely
related to another celebrated contribution to
the literature—Paul Samuelson’s 1954 analysis
of the justification of government action.97
Samuelson employed the concept of “public-
ness,” in which a good could not be made
available exclusively to individuals; if one per-
son received it, everyone did. Everyone in soci-
ety then would benefit from the private con-
sumption of a public good. Private solutions,
however, would fail to adequately recognize all
of these benefits. Thus, the government
should provide the goods.
Coase’s analysis can be restated as indicat-
ing that it is only when publicness was
involved that government intervention to
address externalities might be justified. Coase
can then be credited with creating a different
and superior theory of government action: it is
only when transaction costs are high (but not
by a degree to render action unprofitable) that
government interventionmight be desirable.
The advantage of Coase’s approach is that
it leads to a consideration of critical problems
that the Samuelson analysis ignores. First,
considerable evidence exists that politicians
have motivations far different from attaining
an efficient supply of public goods.98 Second,
theCoaseproblemof attaining anoptimumis
formidable. Governments often lack the com-
petence to identify and optimally correct inef-
ficiencies. Both these difficulties are extensive-
ly reviewed in the economics literature, but the
bad-motivation argument is stressed more
than the limited-ability concern.99
The adoption of inappropriate objectives is
the subject of a very rich literature that exam-
ines the motivations of political actors. The
starting point is Schumpeter’s observation
that, in a democracy, political actors are pri-
marily engaged in a competition for votes.100
As numerous subsequent observers have not-
ed, onekeyway to secure votes is to legislate an
(economically) inefficient policy—in which a
few beneficiaries each receive gains large
enough for them to note—by creating losses
for many others that are too small for any to
notice.101
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Some observers, notably Harvard econo-
mist Joseph Kalt, have examined the proposi-
tion that, in some cases, action arises only
from an ideological preference for interven-
tion by legislators whose constituents lack
significant interest in an issue.102 Kalt and col-
laborators have found statistical support for
this proposition.103 A simpler possibility is
that politicians instinctively believe that if a
problem arises which receives extensive atten-
tion, they can—and should—intervene.
The problem of determining and satisfying
demands for public goods is more loosely
treated in the literature. Economists Ludwig
vonMises, F. A.Hayek, andRonaldCoase have
all argued that, among other things, govern-
ments cannot readily secure the information
needed for efficient intervention.104 Coase’s
treatment is far less extensive, but also farmore
general, than those of Mises or Hayek. Their
extended writings on socialist calculation, nev-
ertheless, should have made clear the difficul-
ties of optimally devising plans for any kind of
government spending. The debate was started
by an assertion by Mises that a socialist state
could not be efficient because it lacked infor-
mation about the demands for commodi-
ties.105 In the most celebrated response, Oscar
Lange106 replied that this problem could be
resolved by establishing planning boards to
measure demands and set prices appropriate
for those demands. Hayek answered Lange by
noting that this was a much more cumber-
some approach than an unregulated market-
place.107 Misesasserted that the solutionwould
break down for producers’ goods because of
concentration of ownership in state monopo-
lies.
In any case, Langewas changing the subject.
His system depended upon the competence of
the planning board, which, after all, could be
imposed on top of any ownership pattern. The
planning board as Lange envisioned it, howev-
er, is the expansion of the public utility com-
mission concept. Thus, it may be asked why a
technique thatworks badlywhen it treats a few
industries could well treat the whole economy
any better. Nevertheless, the literature in this
area strangely evadesdiscussionof the full con-
sequences of this knowledge problem.108 In
practice, the problem is herculean.
Reviews of specific policies have illustrat-
ed the point. Richard Posner’s wide-ranging
review of the regulation of natural monop-
oly, for instance, notes many of the problems
related to securing the informationneeded to
attain efficient results.109
In any case, these basics suggest further rea-
sons to treat recommendations for energy
intervention by theNPCandothers skeptically.
Not only are their proposed remedies nth-best
means of addressing identified problems, they
further assume perfectly informed, hyper-effi-
cient government responses that are implausi-
ble in the extreme.
Conclusion
Bad theory, bad history, and bad practice
mar energy (and most other public policy) dis-
cussions. The shock of 9/11 has badly aggra-
vated these problems. Across an absurdly
broad range of issues, panic over remote possi-
bilities of terrorist actions has producedhyste-
ria. Thepresent paperwaswritten in themidst
of a political campaign in which these prob-
lems seemed particularly severe. As suggested
here, energy, as is usually the case, hasnotbeen
spared. Even a group that should have known
better (the NPC), directed by the former head
of a companyknown for its astuteness (Exxon-
Mobil), could not refrain from a plunge into
this frenzy.
Economic analysis shows both the defects
of public policy and why these faults are
impervious to analytic objection. Interference
with international trade, for example, is rou-
tinely attacked by economists and adopted by
politicians. Ill-advised efforts such as that of
the NPC are regrettable but predictable.
Economists periodically debate whether
their efforts are justified. Surely, without seri-
ous economic analysis, what comprises desir-
able reform remains unknown. Something
must stand against the temptation to seek
narrow political gains. Even those economists
who are particularly concerned about govern-
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ment failure are divided about whether their
efforts are worthwhile. Some stress the many
instances in which the advice was ignored;
others believe that enough good results arise
to provide the encouragement to continue.
Clearly, the analysis here is grounded in the
latter view. Enough successes, both big and
small, have arisen to inspire hope. Opportun-
ities for improvement periodically but unpre-
dictably arise, and economic analyses that pro-
vide guidance can only help assist the response.
Moreover, bad policy imposes wastes that the
power to tax allows to persist. This ability to err
is not unlimited. Intolerable strains do emerge.
Thus, economists should continue the on-
slaught on bad policy to anticipate openings
when they occur. Perhaps future study groups
can be weaned away from ideas that harm
themselves and everyone else.
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